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Complex Electronics (CE) now perform tasks that were previously handled in software, 
such as communication protocols. Many methods used to develop software bare a close 
resemblance to CE development. Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) can have 
over a million logic gates while system-on-chip (SOC) devices can combine a 
microprocessor, input and output channels, and sometimes an FPGA for programmability. 
With this increased intricacy, the possibility of “software-like” bugs such as incorrect 
design, logic, and unexpected interactions within the logic is great.  
 
With CE devices obscuring the hardware/software boundary, we propose that mature 
software methodologies may be utilized with slight modifications in the development of 
these devices. Software Process Assurance for Complex Electronics (SPACE) is a 
research project that used standardized S/W Assurance/Engineering practices to provide 
an assurance framework for development activities.  Tools such as checklists, best 
practices and techniques were used to detect missing requirements and “bugs” earlier in 
the development cycle creating a development process for CE that was more easily 
maintained, consistent and configurable based on the device used.  
 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20070031662 2019-08-30T01:36:50+00:00Z
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The Problem
Complex Electronics (CE) 
devices can have over 
one million gates and 
even a built in 
microprocessor. These 
devices are replacing 
conventional hardware 
and software in many 
critical applications. How 
do we assure quality on 
these devices?
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What has been done?
♦ Software/Hardware techniques have been modified to 
work with complex electronics devices. 
♦ Currently working with multiple projects to verify and 
refine 
• Checklists
• Techniques
• Templates
−Assurance Plan
−Audit
♦ Flow diagrams have been created to aid in CE tracking
♦ Classes have been created for training
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Planning is Where to Start
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Simple or Complex?
♦ The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides a definition in 
DO-254, “Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic 
Hardware” document. It states “A hardware item is identified as 
simple only if a comprehensive combination of deterministic tests 
and analyses appropriate to the design assurance level can ensure 
correct functional performance under all foreseeable operating 
conditions with no anomalous behavior. When an item cannot be 
classified as simple, it should be classified as complex. An item 
constructed entirely from simple items may itself be complex.”
♦ Firmware is not CE. The most common definition is found in IEEE 
610.12-1990: “The combination of hardware device and computer 
instructions and data that reside as read-only software on that 
device.”
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What is the Devices Criticality?
The complex electronics is classified as Low if it does not fall into either of the above categoriesLow
1. The complex electronics executes mission-critical functions but there is redundancy in the 
system 
2. The design is expected to be moderately complex 
3. The design is expected to have moderate risk due to one or more of these factors: 
i. Some requirements undefined or unstable 
ii. Somewhat innovative and untried design approach 
iii. Aggressive schedule 
iv. Design team contains some inexperienced members
Moderate
1. The complex electronics executes safety-critical functions 
2. The complex electronics executes mission-critical functions and is a single point of failure 
3. The design is expected to be highly complex 
4. The design is expected to have significant risk due to one or more of these factors: 
i. Unstable requirements 
ii. Technical concerns with the chosen technology, such as power consumption, design size 
for the chip, timing, packaging, or operating frequency 
iii. Highly innovative and untried design approach 
iv. Highly aggressive schedule 
v. Inexperience of the design team
High
CriteriaCriticality 
Classification
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Assurance Process Planning Checklist
Exit Criteria are met10
- Verification and Validation 9
- Problem Reporting and Corrective Action process 8
- Configuration Management 7
- Risk Management 6
- Safety 5
Update project plans with complex electronics information or 
create new plans for: 
Generate tailored Complex Electronics Assurance Plan. 
(See “Process Checklist for Assurance Planning” for details.)
4
Generate Complex Electronics Development Plan (Eng.). 3
Determine complex electronics criticality classification (high, 
moderate, or low).
2
Entrance Criteria are met1
QAEngCompletion 
Date
Process StepID
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How do You Start the Process?
 Create an Assurance 
Plan for your device
 Can be stand alone or 
part of the larger 
assurance plan
 Plan is based on 
criticality of device(s)
 Get concurrence with the 
plan
 One plan can cover all 
devices needed
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Assurance Planning is Very Important
Assurance Planning Document
Specify criteria and tasks for acceptance of complex electronics. 13
Exit Criteria are met. 20
Identify training and tools required for the assurance tasks.7
Specify tasks for Requirements phase, including reviews, audits, and 
analyses. 
8
Define management of the assurance activities, including organization 
structure, roles and responsibilities, resources, schedule, reporting. 
6
Determine Applicable and Reference standards and documents. 5
Specify purpose and scope of plan. 4
Generate tailored Complex Electronics Assurance Plan (CEAP). This 
includes steps 4 through 14 below. 
3
Concur with complex electronics criticality classification (high, moderate, or 
low). Include in the CEAP (below) 
2
Entrance Criteria are met.1
QACompletion 
Date
Process StepID
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Supporting Processes
 Controlling and monitoring the process used 
is very important.
 Configuration Management
 Problem reporting / monitoring
 Continuous Risk Management
 Audits
 Ad Hoc is NOT a process!
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Involve the Correct People
Assess entrance and exit criteria for each life cycle phase 
Ensure traceability of the requirements through all levels of development 
Analyze the products produced (documents, designs, etc.) against the requirements 
and the output of the previous phase
Perform white box analysis on CE designs and tests
CE Process Assurance 
Identify if complex electronics can cause a hazard or are part of a hazard control 
Ensure that design errors in complex electronics are considered as a failure mode
System Safety 
Derive requirements for the board or chip level 
Design electronics to meet the requirements, using good engineering practices 
Implement the design in hardware 
Test the hardware; Implement changes
Electronics Designer
Define the system requirements 
Decompose system requirements down to sub-system level 
Define system-level testing 
Systems Engineer 
ResponsibilityRole
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Requirements
The first step in any design process should be to define and 
document the requirements and constraints under which the CE 
must operate. This allows you to think through the issues and 
document any design decisions and trade-offs. 
Complex Electronics design is often started based on the engineers 
knowledge of the system, not defined requirements.
Requirements Reviews
 Clear
 Concise
 Confirmable
 Traceable
Interface Control Document verifications
Signals List
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How Complex Electronics Fits into the 
Standard Design Cycle
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Requirements Review Checklist Snippet
Has the timing of critical signals been defined? Timing 28
Is the behavior of the CE in response to an external failure or 
fault specified? 
Error 
Handling 
27
During power-up or reset, do any lines or signals float? Initial 
Conditions
20
For each output signal, is the range of valid data defined? Is a
typical value defined? 
Signals13
For each input signal, is the range of valid data defined? Signals 12
Is the data size and bit order defined? Interfaces 11
Are the overall system configurations and operating modes 
defined? 
General 2
CommentYes/No/
NA
CriteriaTopicID
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Traceability Analysis 
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Design
One major difference between CE and Software is 
the aspect of timing and concurrency.
 Design reviews are important.  
 Independent engineer should review the design
 Confirm the design supports the requirements
 Use a coding standard
 Have and follow Best Practices
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Fault Tree Analysis
18
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Code / Implementation
Although HDL is not true code, it shares many of 
the same features and attributes of software. 
Differences include:
 During synthesis (compile), the design is 
mapped to the logic gates of the device.
 The placement of the logic blocks within the 
chip, and the routing between blocks, are 
some of the processes that occur during 
implementation (link).
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Ease of Coding
 Coding Standards, Code Reviews and Best 
Practices work well on HDLs. They allow:
 Readability
 Standard Signal names
 Names do not change across boundaries
 Common register names
 Maintainability
 Common naming conventions
 Code reviews
 Etc….
20
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VHDL Code Example
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Example of Code Review Best Practices
Are unused functions within the IP cores identified? Is the accidental 
execution of these functions prevented? 
Other 41
The sensitivity list contains only the signals that should cause the 
process to be executed 
Functions 39
All asynchronous inputs are first synchronized before use Interfaces 36
Provides an Asynchronous reset line Reset 34
Names shall be self-explanatory Signals 27
Do not generate the clock using combinational logic Clocks 25
All states in a state machine are defined or  invalid states are
returned to a known state 
General5
CommentYes/No/
NA
CriteriaTopicID
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Test
 While complex electronics use test benches 
and timing models, the idea of a well defined 
suite of test cases is common in both 
disciplines. This includes test plans, fault 
injection and error handling testing and 
verification. 
23
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Test Methodologies
Best Practices
Test Plans 
 Tracing to requirements
 Feasible
 Cover more than just success
 Fault Injection
 Test Verification
Problem Trend Analysis / Tracking
Richard.A.Plastow (SAIC)                            
Sr. Software Assurance Engineer 24
Test Plan Review Checklist
Is the maximum allowable power and current to the CE being 
verified? 
Power/ 
Electrical 
32
Has the timing of critical signals been tested? Timing30
Have all expected errors or faults been tested to verify they are 
handled correctly? 
Error Handling 27
Is the state of programmable memory elements upon power-
up and after a reset tested? 
Initial 
Conditions 
25
For each input signal, is the range of valid data tested? Signals 17
Interfaces with COTS IP modules tested Interfaces 14
Is the functionality of the complex electronics (CE) in off-
nominal mode being tested? 
General4
CommentYes/No/NACriteriaTopicID
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Reality Check
 Many assurance engineers, regardless of their 
specialty, have little understanding of the 
complexities of these devices. Any review done will 
only be to the level of knowledge of the assurance 
engineer. 
 Three courses have been developed
 Introduction to CE
 CE Life Cycle
 Assurance of CE devices
 Techniques and checklists were created to ensure 
quality.
 Not all techniques/checklists used on every part.
 Dependent on criticality and project direction.
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Process Flow Example
27
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Techniques
Change Impact Analysis
Decision Tables/Trees
Design Evaluation
Design Review
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
Function and Physical Configuration Audits
Interface Analysis
Requirements Evaluation
Requirements Review
Risk Analysis
Traceability Analysis
28
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Impact Analysis Defines
Rational for Change
Effects on Internal Interfaces
Effects on External Interfaces
Effects on Hazards
Effects on Operations
Potential for introducing new bugs
Impact of Change (Minor/Major and why)
Testing/Verifications needed
Things to Consider
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Checklists
 Planning Phase
 Requirements Phase
 Preliminary Design Phase
 Detailed Design Phase
 Implementation Phase
 Testing Phase
 Operations Phase
 Assurance Planning
 Modifications or Upgrades
 Audits (Functional Configuration, Physical Configuration and 
In-Process)
 Best Practices (Code Review)
 Testing (Document Review)
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Requirements Phase Process Checklist
 Overview 
 Entrance Criteria 
 Responsible Personnel 
 Process Step – Lists Analysis to use/update, 
documentation(to create, update, etc.), 
supporting processes needed
 Exit Criteria 
 Documentation Status 
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Conclusion
♦Thanks to the NASA Software Assurance Research Program 
which funded this Research and the IV&V center for supporting 
the infusion of this research into NASA projects. 
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